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1. Introduction 
Recently, Linda Zagzebski developed an account of 
cognizers as agents. “An effective agent is reliably 
successful in reaching her ends and she does so through 
the exercise of her own power” (Zagzebski 2001, 151). 
Knowledge is thought of as the result of virtuous agency. 
Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of 
intellectual virtue. X is an act of intellectual virtue A (for 
example: thoroughness, open-mindedness) if and only if 
(i)  x arises from the motivational component of A, 
(ii)  x is something a person with virtue A would 
(probably) do in the circumstances, 
(iii)  x is successful in achieving the end of the A 
motivation and finally truth, because of the fea-
tures (i) and (ii) (Zagzebski 1996, 270-271). 
Zagzebski claims that her explication of the concept of 
knowledge is able to exclude Gettier cases from being 
knowledge. Gettier problems, so we are told, arise for 
every analysis of knowledge which maintains that 
knowledge is true belief plus something else that does not 
entail truth (Zagzebski 1996, 283). In Gettier cases 
condition (iii) is not satisfied. One reaches a belief because 
of one’s intellectually virtuous motivations and activities, 
but one does not reach the truth because of these features 
of the cognitive situation. Consider the case of the 
physician Dr. Jones who diagnoses that patient Smith is 
suffering from a certain virus x on the basis of characteris-
tic symptoms. However, in this case the symptoms are due 
to something else, but as it happens Smith has indeed 
contracted very recently virus x, but so recently that he 
does not yet exhibit symptoms caused by x. If one is 
prepared to speak of knowledge in such cases the 
question arises: Why does Dr. Jones in this case not know 
that Smith suffers from virus x? The answer according to 
Zagzebski would be: Because Dr. Jones, although 
motivated to gain knowledge and using methods known 
reliably to lead to knowledge, does not reach the truth of 
her belief because of her virtuous motivation and proce-
dure. The truth-attainment is not attributable to the agent. 
William Alston (2000, 188) speaks of an “ingenious way 
of handling Gettier problems”. The requirement that “the 
belief’s being true is due to the virtuous motivation” 
prevents “the gap between what makes the belief true and 
what gives rise to its being formed that is characteristic of 
Gettier cases.” 
Ernest Sosa (2002) makes a similar suggestion to 
Zagzebski’s: “So in order for correct belief to be attribut-
able to you as your doing, the being true of your believing 
must derive sufficiently from ‘yourself’ ... “ And a bit later: 
”What we prefer is the deed of true believing, where not 
only the believing but also its truth is attributable to the 
agent as his or her own doing.” 
In the article “What is knowledge?” Zagzebski (1999, 
111) says that we do have an intuition of what could be 
meant by the formulation “truth is achieved because of the 
virtuous motivation and procedure”, but she concedes that 
she does not know of an analysis of the because-of-
relation that is adequate. 
In this paper I want to raise the questions of what could 
be meant by such phrases as “attaining the truth”, 
“attaining the truth because of virtuous motivations and 
procedures”. My suspicion is that no adequate account of 
the because-of-relation can be found. I will try to explain 
why this is so and what it is that misleads to the idea of a 
causal connection between the virtuous motivation and 
activities and the truth of the belief. 
2. The meaning of the phrase “attaining the 
truth” 
The simplest way to understand the phrase “Dr. Jones 
attains the truth” would be to say: 
(i)  Dr. Jones acquires a true belief. 
The word “belief” is ambiguous. With the word “belief” one 
might refer to the intentional content of the belief; or one 
might refer to the state a person is in, the relation she has 
towards the content in question. (A third referent of “belief”, 
which I do not consider here, would be the act of believing 
or assenting to a proposition.) For the sake of clarity, I will 
use from now on “belief” only for the state or disposition a 
person is in; in order to refer to the content I will use “p” for 
“proposition”. Thus we change (i) and write: 
(ii)  Dr. Jones acquires the belief that p,  
  and p is true. 
Here the Gettier-problem arises. Dr. Jones might virtuously 
acquire the belief that p, and p might be true, but the being 
true of p might be unconnected with the virtuous procedure 
of Dr. Jones. To avoid having to let such cases count as 
knowledge, Zagzebski demands that there should be a 
because-of-relation between the virtuous motivation and 
activities and the truth-attainment. The problem is to spell 
out the connection between the agency and the being true 
of a belief. 
3. The meaning of the phrase “attaining the 
truth because of virtuous motivation and 
procedure” 
The phrase could be spelled out in the following way: 
(iii)  p is true because Dr. Jones virtuously  
  believes that p. 
There are two ways one could understand (iii). First in the 
sense in which one says: The weather changes because 
the barometer fell. However, this would not be an 
interpretation of the because-of-relation which Zagzebski 
needs, because in this interpretation the virtuous believer 
is only a criterion that p is true. Secondly, one could 
understand (iii) in terms of an epistemic conception of 
truth. However, the traditional analysis of the concept of 
knowledge presupposes a realistic conception of truth. 
Moreover, in the writings of Zagzebski I have found no 
signs of commitment to an epistemic conception of truth. 
On a realistic conception of truth, p is true because it is the 
case that p. The agent is not the truth-maker. Thus I 
exclude (iii) as a proper interpretation of the because-of-
relation. Another way to understand the phrase would be: 




(iv)  p is believed by Dr. Jones because of her  
  virtuous motivation and activities. 
This interpretation has to be excluded as well because in 
our case it is exactly that what Dr. Jones is doing. In order 
to see where the problem lies, we have to look at the 
particular reasoning process of Dr. Jones: 
(a)  A patient exhibits symptom X, if and only if the  
  patient suffers from virus x. 
(b)  Smith exhibits symptom X. 
(c)  Smith suffers from virus x. 
This is one of the Gettier cases which work via an explicit 
or implicit inference (Swinburne 2001, 193). Dr. Jones is 
justified in believing (a), since no case was known in which 
a patient exhibited X without having contracted virus x, but 
(a) is false. Zagzebski would have to say that in the 
reasoning process of Dr. Jones one non-virtuous act is 
involved, that is, one act which is not successful in 
achieving a true belief. However, this amounts just to the 
old solution that one does not know if one gets a true 
proposition via false propositions. I do not see that the 
appeal to agency, intellectual virtuous motivation and 
activity does anything to solve the problem. 
4. What leads astray 
I want to consider what it could be that leads to the idea 
that there is a chain, reaching from the agent to the truth of 
the belief. 
We know of the Frankfurt-style counterexamples against 
the validity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), 
in which a person P freely brings about a state of affairs S, 
although there is some mechanism that would have 
operated to bring it about that P would have brought about 
S, if P had not done it by herself. The person is judged to 
be morally responsible for her act. One accounts best for 
these cases if one introduces agent causality. The person 
is held responsible because the causal chain starting from 
her as agent and leading to the event in question is not 
interrupted. 
We know of the tricky cases of wayward causation. Tim 
wants to kill his uncle, and he believes that he can find him 
at home. His decision to kill his uncle so agitates him that 
he drives recklessly. He hits and kills a pedestrian, who by 
chance is his uncle. The killing was an accidental 
consequence of what Tim did. If one believes in agent 
causality one is able to handle such cases in a plausible 
way (Meixner 2001, 354). If one believes only in event 
causality one is at pains to explain the difference between 
the killing which is brought about by Tim intentionally, and 
the killing which is brought about by Tim only accidentally. 
The causal chain deriving from Tim as agent does not 
hook up to the event of the uncle’s killing. 
Finally, there is another case, inspired by Sosa (2002): 
Suppose Emma is an archer. She aims to hit the bull’s-
eye. She is a good archer, she has got the skill of archery. 
She hits the bull’s eye because of a skilful shot. She is a 
real star at shooting and is 99 % reliably successful. One 
day she wants again to win the prize. She wants to hit the 
bull’s eye; she uses her skill of archery. However, at the 
very moment she shoots, an unforeseeable gust drives the 
arrow to one side. If there had not been this gust, Emma 
would have hit the bull’s eye. But now the arrow goes 
astray. Now suppose that this incident of bad luck is 
cancelled out by another incident of good luck: a strange 
gust from the other direction brings the arrow in line and 
the arrow lands finally in the bull’s eye. Emma achieves a 
winning shot. But the hitting of the bull’s eye would not be 
attributable to her. She wanted to hit the bull’s eye, her 
shot was just as perfect as ever; but the hitting of the bull’s 
eye did not occur because of these features of the act. 
She did not hit the bull’s eye because of her skill. Other 
causes, which are not under her control, were at work as 
well. The hitting of the bull’s eye was an accidental 
consequence of what Emma did. 
“Hitting the bull’s eye” sounds like “attaining the truth”, 
and one might think that the epistemic case is similar to 
such cases. The idea would be: The chain which relates 
the agent to the truth of the belief must not be interrupted, 
neither through other event-causes, nor through other 
agents. Why does this sort of reasoning not work for the 
quoted epistemic case? My answer is already indicated. I 
distinguish between the mental state of believing and the 
content of the belief. The mental state is what is brought 
about by agent causation. However, in the Gettier-case it 
is not the causal chain which is interrupted, or bypassed. It 
is the logical relation between the contents which produces 
the problem. This would explain why one is unable to find 
an adequate account of the because-of-relation between 
the cognizer as agent and the achieving of the truth. 
5. A useful distinction 
When Thomas Aquinas considers the relation between will 
and intellect, he utilizes the distinction between the 
exercise of an act and the specification of an act.  
“[...] we must take note that the act of the reason may be 
considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the 
act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can 
always be commanded: as when one is told to be 
attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the 
object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to 
be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends the 
truth about something. This act is not in our power: 
because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural 
light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason 
is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The 
other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what 
it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason 
apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. 
the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or 
dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and conse-
quently, properly speaking, is not subject to our com-
mand. But some things which are apprehended do not 
convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it 
free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent 
or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in 
such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is 
subject to our command.” (ST I II 17, 6) 
The exercise of cognitive powers and virtues is within our 
power. But the determination of the act is only in some 
restricted cases within our power. It is within my power to 
open or shut the eyes. But it is not within my power to 
determine that I see green instead of red. It is within my 
power to make a research and to use scientific syllogisms. 
However, it is not within my power that I get as a result p 
instead of q. Aquinas thinks that there is a class of objects 
of cognition which are also quantum ad determinationem 
actus under a certain voluntary control. He thinks that the 
objects of religious belief are of that kind. Probably he 
thinks also that some contingent objects of cognition are of 
that kind, for example the belief that Emma is arrogant. 





If such distinctions could be intelligibly defended - and I 
think that they could - one would have to give up the idea 
that all cognitive virtues are either a subclass of the moral 
virtues or that all cognitive virtues are entirely different 
from moral virtues. Secondly, one would have to give up 
the idea that knowledge is a univocal concept which we try 
to analyse. 
Engaging agent causality in epistemology has some 
advantages, especially for giving an adequate account for 
those procedures of belief-acquisition and beliefs which 
are objects of praise and blame. However, it seems to me 
that the utilisation of the concept of the agent is of no help 
for dealing with the case of Dr. Jones. 
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